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LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
B. Michael Les Benedict*
Professor Berger need offer no justification to historians for his work.
He has contributed not only to our understanding of legal and constitu-
tional history but also to the resolution of current legal-constitutional
problems which have engaged our attention as citizens. Professor Berger
worries that historians derogate "lawyer's history" and perhaps even
believe lawyers "congenitally incompetent to write history because they
are bred as advocates in an adversary system."' 23 In the course of his
chastisement of the Supreme Court for its recognition of the doctrine of
executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, he denies the distinction
between "lawyer's history" and "historian's history."
While I do not suggest that lawyers are inherently incapable of
writing history, Professor Berger's work on executive privilege-his
books and articles upon which his paper is based 124 -is lawyer's
history. I do not mean that in a pejorative sense. It is not bad history,
but it is a kind of history that professional historians ordinarily do not
write and lawyers do-history designed to give direct guidance to
present-day decision makers.
The task Professor Berger set for himself when he began this work
was to find out whether there is legal precedent for the doctrine of
"executive privilege" against congressional inquiry, and, if so, what are
its boundaries. He concluded that the doctrine itself is "a constitutional
myth," and that there are no limits to Congress' power of inquiry into
the operations of government 125 -at least none that the executive can
draw at its own nonreviewable discretion. The book which embodies his
argument and evidence is a powerful legal treatise. It stakes out a legal
position and sustains it, among other ways, through historical inquiry. It
is legal advocacy.
How is that different from what historians do? Professor Berger
* Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University.
123. See text following note 3 supra.
124. See, e.g., ExEcuTVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5; Berger, The Presidential Monopoly
of Foreign Relations, 71 MxCi. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Foreign
Relations]; Incarnation of Executive Privilege, supra note 3; The President, supra note 3.
See also R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as IMPEACHMENT]; Berger, Warmaking by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29
(1972) :[hereinafter cited as Warmaking]; Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional
Inquiry (pts. I & II), 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1043, 1287 (1965) lhereinafter cited as
Congressional Inquiry].
125. See EXECUTrVE PIUVILEGE, supra note 5, at 35-48.
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points out that we historians are not "unstained by advocacy," and are
not-to modify his metaphor-"virgins who stumble on Truth in the
dark."'u2 That is certainly true; we all make subjective judgments. But
we make them in answer to different questions. For Professor Berger the
question is, Is there legal precedent for "executive privilege"? For an
historian investigating the same subject, the questions would likely be,
How and why did the doctrine of "executive privilege"-erroneous or
not-develop? To what degree and over what opposition has it gained
acceptance, and why? Ultimately, one might well decide that there is
little legal precedent for the doctrine; one might conclude that past
experience with such claims indicates that the doctrine is dangerous. But
I believe that those judgments would not be central to the obligations of
an historian. They are not responses to the historical questions I out-
lined.127
What are some of the practical effects of these different approaches?
Professor Berger, seeking legal precedents for claims of executive privi-
lege, discounts the importance of the St. Clair1 2 and Burr trial'29
episodes during the Washington and Jefferson administrations. He
points out that Washington did not act upon his Cabinet's agreement
that the President had the right at his discretion to refuse to transmit to
Congress papers "the disclosure of which would injure the public."'30
Moreover, Professor Berger argues that Jefferson's concurrence in that
Cabinet understanding was based on a faulty assessment of English
law.' 3  Jefferson, as President, privately denied Chief Justice John
Marshall's right to subpoena him or his papers; these denials, however,
were vitiated by his public compliance. 3
2
Professor Berger may be right in dismissing the value of these "prece-
dents" as legal authority. But for an historian investigating the develop-
ment of the concept they are critical. They demonstrate how even the
126. See text following note 3 supra.
127. As citizens and intellectuals concerned with the present operation of our society,
we do have nonprofessional obligations to it. If we have perceptions based on historical
information at our command, we should share those perceptions and the information on
which they are based. Many of our finest historians have done so-Henry Steele
Commager, John P. Roche, and Arthur M. Schlesinger---come to mind immediately.
128. See generally Exnctrvn PRInVEGE, supra note 5, at 167-69.
129. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 55 (Nos. 14692d, 14693) (C.C.D. Va.
1807).
130. Exnctmnr PRIviLEGE, supra note 5, at 168, quoting 1 T. JEFFERSON, WrrNos
189-90 (P. Ford, ed. 1892-1899).
131. Id. at 167-71.
132. See generally id. at 187-91.
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early presidents began to create constitutional doctrines with which to
wage personal or political conflicts.
The claim of executive privilege is part of a presidential arsenal of
weapons with which chief executives have fought essentially political
battles. Executive power has not grown in a vacuum. It has developed in
the course of numerous struggles over issues with far more immediate
meaning for Americans than the institutional arrangement of govern-
mental powers. Washington's decision to withhold from the House of
Representatives his instructions to the negotiators of the Jay Treaty"'8
was part of the bitter conflict between his Federalists and the newly
organizing Republicans. This conflict encompassed a broad range of
issues of which foreign policy was the most important. 84 The Burr trial,
in which President Jefferson attempted to withhold portions of a letter
subpoenaed by the defense, involved a personal struggle between the
President and his old enemy, John Marshall. This struggle had obvious
implications for Marshall's Federalist party and Jefferson's Republi-
cans. 13 5 Similarly, President Jackson's claim of executive power to limit
congressional access to information was part of a general battle over
economic and social policy embodied in the "Bank War," during which
Jackson, in the words of one scholar, "transformed the presidential
office . . . infus[ing] it with much of the power it enjoys today."'130
In each of these conflicts, Presidents harnessed constitutional argu-
ments based on their oaths to defend the Constitution and their obliga-
tion to execute the laws. They utilized political influence derived from
their institutional position as head of state, and they appealed to the
Americans' confidence in the executive office. In response, opponents
marshalled their constitutional arguments and congressional influence;
they appealed to the fear of executive power that was as much a part of
the American heritage as faith in individual Presidents. Each battle left
133. Id. at 171-79.
134. See J. MILLER, THE FnmmrsT ERA 1789-1801, at 164-79 (1960); N.
CUNNINGHAM, THE 3EF RSONIAN REPUBLICANS: THE FORMATION OF PARTY ORoANIZA-
TiONS 1789-1801, at 74-85 (1957).
135. See C. HAInS, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMEICAN Gov RNmENT
AND PoLrrics 1789-1835, at 279-88 (1944). See generally 3 BEvMUin, supra note 122,
at 398-545.
136. R. REmm, ANDR-w JACKsON AND THE BANK WAR 10 (1967). Jackson's effort to
destroy the Bank of the United States led directly to the creation of the second American
party system; his supporters and opponents literally organized around the issue of
presidential power, as well as the social and economic policies he was seeking to promote
through those powers. In fact, Jackson's opponents called their new political organization
the Whig party, to underline their claim to the anti-monarchical heritage of the
American Revolution. Id. at 129.
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new authorities and precedents on each side for use in the next. By
1861, therefore, Americans had traditions both of executive power and
opposition to it, traditions dating from before the framing of the
Constitution.3 7
The Civil War compelled an unprecedented accretion of power in the
presidency, and modern champions of the office have turned to the
Lincoln era to provide early sustenance for claims of inherent executive
power."8" But that growth did not come at the expense of Congress; in
fact, the Civil War marked a tremendous growth in congressional power
as well. Congress created a national banking system, 3 9 suppressed state
banks, 40 reordered the national finances,' 4 ' financed and subsidized
transportation and communication development, 42 established national
137. Professor Berger persuasively documents the Americans' fear of executive tyran-
ny during the Revolutionary Era, and his appreciation of that fear is the sturdy
foundation against which he tests later claims of executive privilege. See ExEctmv
PRrVmEGE, supra note 5, at 49-59. See also IMPEACHMENT, supra note 124, at 97-101.
However, the Constitution was also framed in part in response to legislative tyranny.
The Framers took administration of the laws out of the hands of Congress, where it was
lodged under the Articles of Confederation, and placed it in the hands of an independent
executive. The authority of the President which emerged from the constitutional debate
was far broader than that of the state executives. This broad authority resulted precisely
because many Americans had come to believe that power itself was dangerous no matter
where held-even in the hands of legislatures, which were so long believed to be the
protectors of liberty. The Framers' response was a division of power among governing
institutions so that, in Jefferson's words, "no one could transcend their legal limits,
without being effectually checked and restrained by others." Quoted in WOOD, supra note
103, at 453. See generally id. at 547-53; R. Berg, Presidential Power and Royal
Prerogative 223-326, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the University of Minnesota
Library).
138. See Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Otto Trevelyan, June 19, 1908, in H.
HAGEDORN, Ta THEODORE RoosEvELT TREASURY: A SELF-PoRTRAT FROM His
WRrnNGs 193-95 (1957); P. HEmuNG, PREsIDENTiAL LEADERsmP: THE POLTCAL
RELATIONS OF CONGRESS AND THE CHmF EXECUTVE 15-18 (1940); J. KALLENBACH, Tn
AMERCAN CHIEF ExECuTIVE: Ta PRESIDENCY AND THE GovERNoRsaip 446-51, 460-62
(1966); L. KoEN G, THE CHmF EXEcuT 247-49 (1964); G. MILTON, THE UsE OF
PRESEDENTLAL PowER 1789-1943, at 107-22 (1944); T. ROOSEVELT, A Charter of
Democracy, in 17 THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 119, 121, 123-24, 139 (W.
Andrews ed. 1926); C. RossrrER, THE AMEmCAN PRESENCY 22-23, 54-55, 82, 102-03,
141-42, 228-52 (1956).
139. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
140. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 110, 13 Stat. 223, at 277-78.
141. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99; Act of February 23, 1863, ch. 58, 12
Stat. 665. See L. CuRRY, BLUEPRINT FOR MODERN AMERICA: NONMILrrARY LEGISLATION
Or THE F'RST Crvn WAR CONGRESS 181-206 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CuRRY].
142. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489. See also Act of March 3, 1865, ch.
102, 13 Stat. 526; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 103, 13 Stat. 520; Act of May 5, 1864, ch.
79, 13 Stat. 64; Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 98, 12 Stat. 772; Act of July 12, 1862, ch. 56,
12 Stat. 624; Act of July 5, 1862, ch. 38, 12 Stat. 620; Act of April 25, 1862, ch. 30, 12
Stat. 618. See also CuRRY, supra note 141, at 116-48.
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conscription, 143 provided the mechanics for state-subsidized higher edu-
cation,144 promoted agricultural development, 145 and provided a
federal bureaucracy to oversee the transition from slave to free labor in
the South. 48 Moreover, it took congressional action finally to free the
slaves and to legitimize and regularize Lincoln's limits on wartime civil
liberties. 47
If proof was needed that Congress retained its institutional power
during the War, it was provided by the great struggle between President
Andrew Johnson and the Republican congressional majority over Re-
construction. With adversaries controlling different branches of govern-
ment, the political issue inevitably became one of control of institutional
power. Ultimately, the contest ended with a congressional victory-
Johnson's impeachment trial and capitulation on the Reconstruction
issue.' 48 The post-Civil War era has generally been considered an age of
congressional supremacy over the Executive, but the reality was some-
thing less. Republicans themselves had a stake in promoting the prestige
of the presidency during the Grant administration. And while attacks on
presidential power continued through Grant's terms, especially in regard
to the use of military force to police the political process in the South,
most of these attacks emanated from those who had sustained John-
son. 49
Against this background, there were several instances of claims of
executive power to withhold information from Congress. In 1876 Presi-
143. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731. See H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT
UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION
215-23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HYMAN]; I. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
UNDER LINCOLN 239-74 (1964) [hereinafter cited as RANDALL].
144. Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503. See CutRY, supra note 141, at 108-15.
145. Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503; Act of May 15, 1865, ch. 72, 12 Stat.
387. See P. GATES, AGRiCuLTURE AND rHE Crvu WAR 259-71, 283-300, 301-23 (1965).
146. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. See G. BENTLY, A HISTORY OF THE
FREEDMEN'S BUREAu: A CHAPTER IN THE ISTORY oF RECONSTUCTION passim (1955);
W. McFEELY, YANKEE STEPFATHER: GENERAL 0.0. HowARD AND THE FREEDMEN 20-23
(1968).
147. U.S. CNST. amend. XII; Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. See
HYMAN, supra note 143, at 245-62; RANDALL, supra note 143, at 118-214.
148. See M. BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BENEDICT]. Cf. D. DEWITr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON: A HISTORY (1903). For background on the conflict between presi-
dential and congressional claims of authority over Reconstruction, see H. BELz, RECON-
STRucriNG THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY DuRNo TIM CIVIL WAR 2-7 and passim
(1969).
149. See L. COOLIDGE, ULYSSES S. GRANT 421-24 (1917); W. HESsELTINE, ULYSSES S.
GRANT, POLITICIAN passim (1935).
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dent Grant refused to answer a House resolution inquiring into what
official duties he performed while absent from Washington.15 In 1877
John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, refused to give reasons public-
ly for the change in the management of the New York Custom House. 51
In 1886 President Cleveland refused to transmit papers relating to his
removal of federal officers.152 Additionally, in 1879, a House commit-
tee, while assessing a rather distantly related matter, recognized an
unrestricted right in the President to withhold information. 153
Like earlier controversies over "executive privilege," these instances
were manifestations of deeper political conflicts. Congressional Demo-
crats sought to embarrass the corruption-ridden Grant administration
with the query about his official activities outside Washington. 54 Trea-
sury Secretary Sherman's refusal to turn over papers or testify about the
New York Custom House personnel changes was part of Hayes's deadly
war over patronage with New York's powerful Republican Senator
Roscoe Conkling.' 5 Cleveland was reluctant to give his reasons for
150. Letter from U.S. Grant to the House of Representatives, May 4, 1876, in 7 J.
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-
1897, at 361-66 (1898) [hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON].
151. To answer in an official way the questions put to me would not only compel
me to violate the trust and confidence reposed in me by the President, necessary
for the transaction of the business of this Department, but to disclose papers of a
confidential character filed in the Department . . . . I do not think it within the
just limits of the intercourse of the Senate with executive officers to answer in writ-
rng, or even verbally, all the questions submitted by you-nor have I ever known
such an instance.
. . To answer your questions would compel me to state to a committee of -the Sen-
ate the reasons of an appointment by the President, to disclose confidential com-
munications between the President and the Secretary, and to enter into an arraign-
ment and accusation of the officers superseded.
Letter from John Sherman to Roscoe Conkling, Chairman of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Nov. 17, 1877, in 17 CONG. REC. 2332 (1886) (remarks of Senator Kenna)
[hereinafter cited as Letter of John Sherman].
152. See G. CLEVELAND, PRESIDENTIAL PROBLEMS 3-76 (1904); 1 R. McELRoY,
GRovER CLEvELAND: TnE MAN AND THE STATESMAN: AN AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 166-83
(1923); A. NEVINS, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN COURAGE, 257-65 (1932).
153. H.R. Rep. No. 141, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (Mar. 5, 1879).
154. See U.S. Department of Justice, Is A Congressional Committee Entitled to
Demand and Receive Information and Papers from the President and Heads of Depart-
ments Which They Deem Confidential, in the Public Interest?, Hearings on the Availa-
bility of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies, Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 84 Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 12, at
2892, 2901 (1956).
155. See D. CHIDsEY, THm GENTLEMAN FROM NEw YORK: A LIFE OF ROSCOE
CONKINO 244-54, 267-70 (1935); K. DAVISON, ThE PRESIDENCY OF RumHmaolD B.
HAYES 164-65 (1972); A. HoOGENBOOM, OUTIAWING THE SIoILs: A HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-1883, at 155-63, 167-71 (1961); D. JORDON,
ROSCOE CONKLNG OF NEW YORK: VOICE IN THE SENATE 267-301 (1971); Shores, The
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replacing Republican office-holders with Democrats at least in part
because he had promised during his campaign to eliminate politics from
the civil service.'5 6
A superficial look at these controversies has comforted supporters of
the executive privilege. 157 In none of them was Congress able to force
the President to divulge the information he retained. In several Congress
finally gave in on the political issue that had precipitated the constitu-
tional fight. For example, Congress ultimately confirmed President
Cleveland's appointees despite his refusal to transmit the specific reasons
and supporting documents for the removal of their predecessors.5 8 In
one case it was a committee of Congress itself that voluntarily conceded
a discretionary right to the President to withhold information.'"
Opponents of the doctrine, however, might take heart from closer
analysis. President Grant did not claim a discretionary right to withhold
information when he refused to answer the Hous&s inquiry into his
extra-White House official activities, but rather he denied that Congress
could demand information where it had no power to legislate. That is,
he did not claim an executive power, instead he challenged Congress'
jurisdiction:
What the House of Representatives may require as a right in its demand
upon ,the Executive for information is limited to what is necessary for
the proper discharge of its powers of legislation or of impeachment.' 09
If this precludes the general and unlimited power of inquiry in the
Congress posited by Professor Berger,' 6' it still falls far short of the
power claimed in recent times for the President to withhold from
Congress at his uncontrolled discretion any information he deems fit.
Moreover, I have found no record of Congress' response.
The 1877 precedent also seems less sturdy under close analysis. When
Senator Conkling sought to protect his political allies in the New York
Hayes-Conkling Controversy 1877-1879, in 4 Smrr COLLEGE STUDmS I HISTORY, No.
4 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Shores].
156. See H. MERRILL, BOURBON LEADER: GROVER CLEVELAND AND THE DEMocRATC
PARTY 102-04 (1957); H. MoRGAN, FRom HAYEs TO McKN.EY: NATIONAL PARTY
PoLTxcs 1877-1896, at 249-54 (1969) Tereinafter cited as MORoAN].
157. See, e.g., A. BRECxENRmGE, THE ExEcUnVE PRVmEGE: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
OVER INFoRMATToN 45-48, 101-02 (1974); Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 93, at 13-16;
Rogers, Constitutional Law: The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J. 941, 944
(1958); Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10
FE3. B.J. 103, 121-26, 238-40 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Wolkinson].
158. See notes 151, 156 supra.
159. See note 153 supra.
160. Quoted in 7 RIcHARDSON, supra note 150, at 362.
161. ExEcurwn PRIvIm, supra note 5, at 15-48.
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Custom House by asking Secretary Sherman for the grounds of their
removal, Sherman did refuse to answer on broad grounds of confiden-
tiality similar to those forwarded today, as well as on separation of
powers grounds:
To answer... the questions put to me would not only compel me
to violate that trust and confidence reposed in me by the President,
necessary for the transaction of the business of this Department but to
disclose papers of a confidential character ... and to enter into the
discussion of questions totally immaterial to the nominations submitted
to the Senate ....
The President has the power to nominate. . . and it is within the
power of the Senate to either confirm or reject.
...To answer your questions would compel me ... to disclose
confidential communications between the President and the Secre-
tary 162
But the Senate hardly can be said to have acquiesced. President Hayese
nominees to replace Conkling's Custom House cronies were refused
confirmation, largely because Conkling argued that no derelictions had
been proven against his friends.' Hayes finally did succeed in winning
Senate confirmation for new appointees over a year later, but only after
Sherman voluntarily sent the Senate a detailed statement of the charges
against the original officers. 164
The 1886 battle over President Cleveland's instructions to his Attor-
ney General to withhold correspondence regarding the replacement of
federal officers also appears less formidable on inspection. The letters
included demands for Democratic access to patronage which would have
been seriously embarrassing to an administration already under attack
for failing to fulfill its commitment to civil service reform. 1 5 Cleveland
ordered the refusal on two grounds: first, that the correspondence was
private and not the sort of official papers Congress had the right to
see,1 6 and second, that the Senate had no jurisdiction over removals
from office and therefore had no right to demand papers involving that
question, "save through the judicial process of trial and impeach-
ment."'167 Cleveland specifically assured the Senate that he did not claim
162. Letter of John Sherman, supra note 151.
163. Shores, supra note 155, at 244.
164. Id. at 257-58.
165. MORGAN, supra note 156, at 249-54; J. SPROAT, "THE BEST MEN": LmERAL RE-
FORmEns iN THE GaDED AGEB 265-67 (1968).
166. 8 RiCHARDsoN, supra note 150, at 377-79.
167. Id. at 379-82.
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
that the President could order a subordinate to withhold information
simply because he "is the servant of the President," 168 the Nixonesque
ground claimed by Attorney General Kleindienst in 1973.160 Cleve-
land's claim boiled down to one involving the definition of official
papers and to the jurisdictional argument made by Grant in 1876 that
Congress could not demand papers where it could not legislate, except
in the case of impeachment.
The battle in Congress was waged on these grounds alone, with
Cleveland's defenders affirming
once for all, that any and every public document, paper, or record on
the files of any Department, or in the possession of the President, re-
lating to any subject whatever, over which either House of Congress has
any grant of power, jurisdiction, or control under the Constitution,
is subject to the call or inspection of either House for use in the exer-
cise of its constitutional powers and jurisdiction .... But if all the
power granted in the Constitution over the subject matter . . . is
vested... in the President exclusively, the only rightful custodian of
all such papers or documents is the chief executive. 170
But the Senate rejected even this limited restriction on its power of
inquiry, by voting to censure the Attorney General for obeying the
President's instructions.17'
The House Judiciary Committee's spontaneous affirmation of presi-
dential power to withhold information came in connection with a quite
different case. Minister to China, George F. Seward, accused of finan-
cial peculation in his prior Chinese post, refused to honor the sub-
poena duces tecum issued by the House Committee on expenditures
in the State Department on the basis of his right against self-incrimina-
tion.'12 When that committee recommended that Seward be held in
contempt, 173 the question was referred to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, which sustained Seward's position on several grounds, and gratui-
tously added its view favoring executive privilege. 7 4 The decision found
168. Id. at 377.
169. 1 Hearings on S. 858, S. Cong. Res. 30, SJ. Res. 72, S. 1106, S. 1142, S. 1520, S.
1923, and S. 2073 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers and
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 46 (1973).
170. S. REP. No. 135, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 2810 (1886).
171. 17 CoNG. R.c. 2810 (1886).
172. H.R. REP. No. 117, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (1879).
173. Id.
174. H.R. REP. No. 141, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (1879).
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its way into Hind's Precedents,'75 and thence into the defense of execu-
tive privilege. 76 But the House Judiciary Committee never was able to
present its report in the hectic closing hours of the forty-fifth Congress.
The opinion did not pertain to the question before the committee, and
the committee itself admitted that it had "been impossible. . . to afford
. . . time in which this grave question might be more satisfactorily and
exhaustively examined."'177 Moreover, only a filibuster by Republicans
prevented House Democrats from voting to impeach Seward on articles,
one of which was based in part on his refusal to transmit his books.' 78
That each of these instances of executive withholding are indeed
weaker than they first appear, and stem from political conficts be-
tween the congressional and executive branches while controlled by
opposing parties, is underscored by the fact that Lincoln, the President
who made the greatest claim for executive power during the nineteenth
century, never claimed the power to withhold information from Con-
gress, even though he was burdened with one of the most powerful, far-
reaching, and active investigating committees ever created by
Congress-the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. That
committee reviewed military tactics and strategy, evaluated command-
ers' abilities, assessed the administration of the armed forces, investi-
gated the efficiency and honesty of military procurement, and watched
over the regulation of commercial intercourse with the rebels. Author-
ized to inquire into the conduct of the war generally, its "powers were
as broad as they were absolute," one commentator has written, "for it
is difficult to discover any large activity of the administration in that
period from 1861 to 1865 that did not have a more or less close relation
to the conduct of the war."' 79 Lincoln refrained from challenging its
authority even though the committee trenched directly upon his author-
ity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and by 1864 verged on
open hostility to his administration. 80
To an historian it is apparent that by the 1880's two cogent, well-
documented, almost traditional arguments had been established on both
175. 3 A. HINDS, P]RECEDEMNTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA&TVES §§ 1699, 1700
(1907).
176. See Wolkinson, supra note 157, at 238-40.
177. H.R. REP. No. 141, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (1879); H.R. REP. No. 117, 45th Cong.
3d Sess. (1879).
178. CONG. REc. 2347-85, passim (1879).
179. Pierson, The Committee on the Conduct of the Civil War, 23 AM. HisT. REV.
550, 560 (1928).
180. Trefousse, The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 10 CIvIL WAha HST.
5, 19 (1964).
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sides of the issue of the President's power to withhold information from
Congress. Each side could cite precedents, constitutional texts, congres-
sional debates, and arguments from legal authorities, and each could
appeal to contradictory, yet commonly held notions of American gov-
ernment.
This conclusion offers little comfort to lawyers seeking to extract a
general principle of constitutional law from historical precedent, of
course. Yet is it proper for a legal scholar to throw up his hands and
give up on historical investigation as a tool of legal analysis, grousing
that "the historical episodes . . are ambiguous, unyielding to concep-
tual analysis, and the unique product of the particular political struggle
from which they arose"?181 Is it right that the Supreme Court, familiar as
it must be with the historical debate, should have decided the main issue
of United States v. Nixon without reference to historical precedent?
Should we be satisfied with the bald, undocumented pronunciamento
that the Constitution's enumeration of executive powers implies a presi-
dential right to confidentiality (a much broader privilege than Grant or
Cleveland contended for) "too plain to require further discussion"?1 82
By nature legal argument is historical. It turns on precedent. The
word itself demonstrates that present law derives its authority from the
past. Lawyers and courts must not ignore history simply because its
complexities and ambiguities trouble them. Nor is the requirement
satisfied by the sort of superficial skimming of history that marks so
much legal argument. Like most legal advocates, the defenders of
executive privilege have turned to history for support, and they have
performed the rote task of cataloging past instances of executive deci-
sions to withhold information from congressional scrutiny, secure in the
probably unconsciously held conviction that this is all that is required.
They make superficial assertions about the intent of the Framers to
build a rigid separation of powers, to vest a latent "executive power" in
the President. Historians wince. How often we know that glib legal
assertions about the past are based on shallow understandings. However,
we are not lawyers; we carp from the outside.
But Professor Berger demonstrates for all to see how powerful a
weapon sophisticated historical analysis can be in the lawyer's arsenal.
His analysis literally demolishes the historical arguments of his oppo-
nents, simply because he understands and conveys the intellectual envi-
" 181. Frohnmayer, An Essay on Executive Privilege, in EssAYs ON EXECUTIVE
PnrimvEGE 1, 17 (1974).
182. 418 U.S. at 705,
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ronment at the time the Constitution was framed. He digs into the
circumstances of his opponents' precedents; he simply works harder at
history than they do. As a result he can train heavy artillery on their ill-
prepared fortifications. But there are strong historical arguments on the
other side. Proponents of the doctrine of executive privilege should
study their own precedents more intently and develop a control over
their history.183
Of course history will not provide the correct answer to the riddle of
executive privilege. Advocates on either side will arrive at differing
conclusions. But that is why we have courts. Given sophisticated histori-
cal arguments, judges must decide where the weight of history lies. Is it
not better that those decisions be based on thorough, professional
historical research than the simple culling of quotes and listing of events
that is all too common?
Professor Berger and other leading legal scholars 184 fear the effect of
United States v. Nixon in legitimizing the "executive privilege" doctrine.
As a citizen, I must say I share that concern, especially since the Court
speaks of a right to "confidentiality." It makes pale by comparison
another, more professionally-oriented disappointment. That is that the
Supreme Court in deciding this case, which turns so obviously on
historical evidence, chose to ignore that evidence. I sympathize with
Professor Berger's defense of the lawyer's use of history. "Lawyer's
history," when well done, plays an important role in our constitutional
system. And I know he sympathizes with me when I express my wish
that lawyers themselves-and in this case the Supreme Court-would
share his appreciation.
183. See, e.g., text accompanying note 137 supra.
184. See, e.g., A Symposium on United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1 (1974).
19751
